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SACRED SECRETS: A CALL FOR THE EXPANSIVE
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
CLERGY-COMMUNICANT PRIVILEGE
Counsel in the heart of man is like deep water; but a man of
understanding will draw it out.'
The sustaining function of the cure of souls in our day continues
to be a crucially important helping ministry .... Tightly knit

communities once furnished friends and neighbors who could
stand by in moments of shock, whereas in a society on wheels the
task of providing such sustenance to urban and suburban people
falls heavily upon the clergy.2
I. INTRODUCTION

More than forty percent of Americans who seek counseling or
guidance initially consult a clergyperson. 3 Clergy are generally

accessible4 and may also have had previous contact with the counselee in
a noncounseling environment, thus establishing some prior degree of

trust.5 This trust may be enhanced by the nature of the religious calling
because a clergyperson's authority may be perceived as ultimately derived

from God. 6 Thus, a person seeking help may assume that confidences

1. Proverbs 20:5 (King James).
2. WILLAM A. CLEBsCH & CHARLES R. JAEKLE, PASTORAL CARE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 80 (1964).
3. Ezra E.H. Griffith & John L. Young, Pastoral Counseling and the Concept of
Malpractice, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 257, 257 (1987).
4. See generally HOWARD CINEBELL, BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL COUNSELING 46-71
(1984). Clinebell notes several strategic advantages of the clergy-counselor, including a
high level of trust, the identity of the role, established relationships, family contacts,
frequent presence in crisis times, unique training, and the availability of most clergy. He
believes that "[a] troubled person can usually see a minister without waiting several days
S. . often without maldng an appointment in advance." Id. at 71. Moreover, that
clergypersons "can counsel without charging is also an advantage in that it allows them to
see persons, including the very poor, entirely on the basis of need." Id.
5. Id. at 54, 79.
6. See Kenneth L. Woodward & Patricia King, When a Pastor Turns Seducer,
NEWsWEEK, Aug. 28, 1989, at 48; see also CLINEBELL, supra note 4, at 67-70 (stating that
"ministers tend to be perceived as religious authority figures, as religious 'transference
figures'").
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entrusted to God's care can also be entrusted to God's emissary on earth.
Unfortunately, such an assumption of confidentiality may not be prudent.
This note focuses on confidential communications between clergy and
those seeking counsel, and on the privileged nature of such
communications Part H provides a brief overview of the historical and
7. See Weldon Ponder, Wll Your Pastor Tell?, LIBERTY, May-June 1978, at 2.
8. The clergy-communicant privilege is a testimonial privilege governed in the federal
courts by FED. R. EVID. 501 and in the state courts by statute. Rule 501 applies to
privileges generally, including attorney-client, doctor-patient, husband-wife, and clergycommunicant. The rule, however, does not govern these privileges in specific terms.
Rather, it provides for common law interpretation "[e]xcept as otherwise required by the
Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Id. Moreover, the rules of privilege
"shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id.
In 1973, the Supreme Court proposed specific provisions delineating thirteen
privileges. The clergy-communicant privilege was proposed as Rule 506, which provided
a rather expansive scope for the privilege:
(a) DEFINrONS. As used in this rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar
functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so
to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of
the purpose of the communication.
(b) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEE. A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by
the person to a clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual adviser.
(c) WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVIE. The privilege may be claimed by the

person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he
is deceased. The clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. His
authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (proposed 1973).
Much controversy accompanied Rule 506 and the other proposed privilege provisions.
See FED. R. EVID., ART. V, comm. 500.1. The clergy-communicant privilege, however,
was one of the least controversial. The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence saw the privilege as "merely defining a long-recognized principle of American
law." Inre Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990). The Advisory
Committee wrote in its note to proposed Rule 506:
The choice between a privilege narrowly restricted to doctrinally required
confessions and a privilege broadly applicable to all confidential communications
with a clergyman in his professional character as a spiritual adviser has been
exercised in favor of the latter. Many clergymen now receive training in
marriage counseling and the handling of personality problems. Matters of this
kind fall readily into the realm of the spirit.
56 F.R.D. at 248. Ultimately, Congress eliminated all of the specific privilege provisions
promulgated by the Court and adopted Rule 501, the single, general privilege rule now in
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current statutory status of the privilege, highlighting some inherent
difficulties in statutory definition, interpretation, and variation. Part I
raises several contemporary issues that have been, or could become,
increasingly problematic for courts applying the privilege, including
secular pastoral counseling, pluralism and the definition of clergy,
marriage counseling, and child abuse counseling. Part IV considers the
constitutional and public policy justifications of the privilege. Finally, this
writer concludes that the best construction and interpretation of the
privilege is the broadest one possible. In spite of the judiciary's discomfort
with absolutes, the best statute or judicial decision in this area is one
granting a virtually absolute privilege, holding inviolate any intended
confidential communication between clergy and communicant.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM COMMON LAW TO STATUTE

Although there is historical evidence that the clergy-communicant
privilege has roots in English law before the Restoration, 9 the privilege
was not a part of the common law adopted in this country.I Blackstone's
Commentaries do not even mention the privilege, and Wigmore, in his
authoritative treatise on evidence, asserted that although the privilege was
not a part of the common law, it is justifiably recognized on policy
grounds. In support of that assertion, Wigmore applied the following
four prerequisites to a claim of privilege: (1) the allegedly privileged
communication must have originated in confidence that it would not be
disclosed, (2) the asserted confidentiality must be essential to satisfactory
maintenance of the relationship between the parties, (3) this relationship
must be one that, in the opinion of the community, should be sedulously
fostered, and (4) the damage resulting from disclosure must exceed the
benefit that would ensue from a more expeditious disposition of the
effect.
The privilege is known by a variety of statutory and common law classifications,
including priest-penitent privilege, priest-communicant privilege, clergy-penitent privilege,
and clergy-communicant privilege. For purposes of inclusiveness and clarity, the term
"clergy-communicant privilege" is used throughout this note to encompass all of the
aforementioned statutory and common law classifications.
9. See WILIAM H. TIEMANN & JOHN C. BUsH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED

CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 39 (1983).
10. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961 & Supp. 1988).
11. WILIAmBLACKSToNE, COMMENTARiES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (photo. reprint
1983) (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765).
12. See WIGMORE, supra note 10, §§ 2394-96.
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cause.13 Wigmore concluded that the clergy-communicant privilege
satisfied these requirements. 14
Even Jeremy Bentham, considered by Wigmore to be "the greatest
opponent of privileges," 5 believed that the clergy-communicant privilege
was worthy of recognition. 16 Bentham's words portend of the
constitutional dimension and dilemma that no court has yet confronted

directly:
In the character of penitents, the people would be pressed with
the whole weight of the penal branch of the law: inhibited from

the exercise of this essential and indispensable article of their
religion: prohibited, on pain of death, from the confession of all
such misdeeds as, if judicially disclosed, would have the effect of
drawing down upon them that punishment .... 7
Bentham's assertion, directed toward the secrecy of the Catholic

confessional, is problematic in the context of contemporary society, in
which most religious bodies do not require or sacramentalize
confession.' Nonetheless, the broader implications of the connection
13. Id. § 2396.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See 4 JEREmy BENTHAM, RAIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 586 (photo. reprint
1978) (1827). Bentham, a nineteenth-century English authority on evidence law, was widely
known as an opponent of testimonial privileges. He believed that the need for the "best
evidence" required that all relevant evidence be revealed. See id. at 481. Consequently, his
recognition of the validity of the clergy-communicant privilege is of great import.
17. Id. at 588. Although no court has decided a case concerning the clergycommunicant privilege on constitutional grounds, a district court in Utah discussed the
constitutional issues in Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 618-19 (D. Utah 1990). The
court upheld the privilege on evidentiary and statutory grounds.
18. "Sacraments," for Christians, are those rites ordained by Jesus and understood to
be symbols, signs or consecrations of Jesus's life and teachings. Christians are expected
to partake of and participate in the sacraments throughout their lives. "Penance" is one of
seven sacraments recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It involves the confession of
sin or wrongdoing, repentance of that wrongdoing, and submission to penalties imposed.
The other sacraments recognized by the Catholic Church include baptism, confirmation, the
Eucharist (or the Lord's Supper), holy orders (ordination), matrimony, and extreme unction
(burial rite). Protestant churches generally recognize only two sacraments-baptism and
the Lord's Supper.
When construing the applicability of the clergy-communicant privilege, some courts
have decided the issue on the basis of the sacraments recognized by the particular religion
involved. Thus, if that church specifies and prescribes the sacrament of penance (or
confession), the privilege will be recognized. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text
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between the free exercise of religion and the privilege are provocative. 19
The "free exercise justification" was noted in the first American case
dealing with the privilege. In 1813, the New York Court of General

Session decided People v. Phillips.' In Phillips, a parishioner confessed
to his priest that he had recovered stolen goods. After the parishioner was
charged, the priest refused to testify, claiming that the canons 21 of the

Roman Catholic Church held him to secrecy.' The Phillps court stated
that the priest could not be compelled to testify because such an order
would infringe on the free exercise of his religion: "It is essential to the

free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should be administered-that
its ceremonies as well as its essentials should be protected.

"I

The difficulty with Phillips, as with Bentham's assertion, is that the

court focused on the sacramental and prescribed nature of the confessional
for Catholics, leaving open the question of whether clergy of other
denominations would be protected.' In a subsequent New York case,

People v. Smith,' the court answered this question negatively. In Smith,

for a discussion of related case law. Most modem statutes explicitly include confessions
other than those in the Catholic Church as privileged communications, even if they do not
include communications that are not confessional in nature.
19. See infra notes 165-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
constitutional implications.
20. Phillipswas not officially reported, but is excerpted in Privileged Communications
to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955) [hereinafter Privileged Communications].
21. Canon law is the compilation of the ecclesiastical laws of the Roman Catholic
Church. Confidentiality in the Catholic Church is governed by provisions of canon law,
most specifically through the "seal of confession." Applicable canonical provisions include
1983 CODE c.1388, §§ 1, 2 (Book VI, Sanctions in the Church), and id. c.983, §§ 1, 2,
and c.984, §§ 1, 2 (Book IV, The Office of Sanctifying in the Church). Canons governing
confidential oral communications include id. c.127, § 3; c.377, §§ 2, 3; c.1455, §§ 1, 2.
Some of the relevant language of the canons provides:
The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any
way to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason.
Id. c.983, § 1.
A confessor who directly violates the seal of confession incurs an automatic
(latae sententiae) excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See; if he does so
only indirectly, he is to be punished in accord with the seriousness of the
offense.
Id. c.1388, § 1.
22. Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 200.
23. Id. at 207.
24. See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent
Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 105 n.53 (1983). For a general discussion of the
applicability of Bentham's assertion to non-Catholic clergy communications, see TIEMANN
& BUSH, supra note 9, at 126.
25. The case was not officially reported, but portions of the text are excerpted in
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a Protestant pastor was forced to testify concerning the confession of a
prisoner charged with murder.' It is perhaps not surprising that, in
response to the controversial Smith decision, the New York legislature
considered the issue and in 1828 enacted the first statute establishing the
privilege.?
Given the sensitive relationship between religion and law, it is also
understandable that the judiciary has been generally reluctant, absent
statutory guidance, to confront the privilege through litigation.' After
Smith, there was little mention of the privilege in case law until the
Supreme Court stated in dictum that "[o]n this principle, suits cannot be
maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the
confessional."" Although this authority was merely persuasive, it was
given great credence, for, in the absence of a statute and without common
law precedent, the highest court in the land had recognized the legitimacy
of the privilege? 0
Nonetheless, the privilege was never considered absolute. Several
nineteenth-century
courts compelled clergy testimony if the

communications were not confessional in nature,31 not made to a
clergyperson acting in professional character, 2 or not made to the

Privileged Communications, supra note 20.
26. Id. at 211 ("His Honour thereupon decided that the testimony was admissible, and
took distinction between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline,
according to the canons of the church, and those made to a minister of the gospel in
confidence, merely as a friend or an advisor.").
27. See 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. VII, tit. III, § 72 (1828) (current version at N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 4505 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1991)). The statute provided that "[n]o
minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to
disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of
discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination." Id.
New York's current statute limits the privilege to "a clergyman, or other minister of
any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner... [and covers] a confession
or confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor." N.Y. CIv.
PRAC. L. & R. 4505 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1991).
28. See Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Commnications, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 1450, 1556 (1985).
29. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). In this case, considering
whether the U.S. was bound by a war-time contract for confidential services, the
government argued that national secrets would be disclosed if the suit was tried. The
Supreme Court agreed, saying that maintaining the suit would "inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential." Id.
30. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 107.
31. See, e.g., Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881) (holding that a communication with
a church official was not a confession within the statutory meaning and thus not privileged).
32. See, e.g., People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (holding that
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clergyperson in a private setting.' Despite the relative paucity of
litigation, legislators increasingly came to believe that the privilege should
be recognized.' Thus, by 1963, forty-four states followed New York's
lead and enacted statutes authorizing some form of.the privilege.' 5
Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have established the

privilege statutorily,' albeit with a wide variance among the applicable
provisions.3 7
admissions to the president of a church were not privileged).
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818) (holding that a public
confession before a clergyman and members of a church was not privileged).
34. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 107-08.
35. See id. at 108.
36. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1990); ALASKA CT. R. EvID. 26(b)(4) (1978); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (1987 & Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1641-101 (Michie 1987), ARK. R. EviD. 505; CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1992);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West
Supp. 1991); DEL. R. EVID. 505; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch.
90.505 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 626-1 (1985 & Supp. 1991), HAW. R. EVID. 506; IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1990); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §
34-1-14-5 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 662.10 (West 1950 & Supp.
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60429 (1965 & Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992); ME. R. EVID. 505; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1989);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060
(Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-506 (1985 & Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1986 & Supp. 1991); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. R. EVID. § 11-506 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.Y.
CirV. PRAC. L. & R. 4505 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §8-53.2
(1986 & Supp. 1991); N.D. R. EvID. 505; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson
1991 & Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.260, R. EVID. 506 (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (1982 &
Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Coop. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-17 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206
(1980 & Supp. 1991); TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987 &
Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1983 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 57-3-9 (Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991);
WYo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1991).
37. For a synopsis of the statutory provisions of each state, see DONNA K. IOPPOLO
ET AL., CONFIDENTIAlITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGAL AND CANONICAL STUDY 4992 (1988).
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The little case law that has developed under the statutes generally
concerns definition and application of the privilege. When does the
privilege apply? Who qualifies as clergy? What kind of communication is
protected? Who may invoke or waive 38 the privilege?
A 1931 case, In re Swenson, 39 extended the privilege to non-Catholic
clergy and communicants. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the

state's privilege statute to include a voluntary "confession" to a Lutheran
pastor, overruling a lower court's decision that the statute applied only to
penitents who were required to confess and to clergy who were required
to hear confession and maintain secrecy as part of church discipline.'
The lower court reasoned that, because the Lutheran Church did not
require confession or the secrecy of that confession, the privilege did not
apply.4 The42 Minnesota Supreme Court called such a limitation an
"absurdity."

The question is not the truth or merits of the religious persuasion

to which a party belongs nor whether the particular creed or
denomination exacts, requires, or permits a sacred
communication; but the sole question is . . . whether the party
38. "Waiver" is generally understood to occur if the communicant explicitly or
implicitly states that intention. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
But cf. EDWARD W. CLEARY E' AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2(b) (3d ed. Supp.
1987) (stating that some states confer an independent privilege on the clergy). Waiver also
occurs when, without coercion, the communicant has disclosed the communication to
someone other than the protected parties, see De'udy v. De'udy, 495 N.Y.S.2d 616, 618
(Sup. Ct. 1988), or, in some states, if a third, unprotected party is present or hears the
communication, see WIGMORE, supra note 10,

§ 2394.

39. 237 N.W. 589 (Minn. 1931).
40. See id. at 591. The terms "course of discipline," "church discipline," and
"church tenets" are used interchangeably throughout this note to indicate a specific mandate
or principle governing the clergy and members of a particular church. In the Catholic
Church, "course of discipline" is a formal mandate explicitly stated in canon law. In other
churches or religious organizations, it may be explicitly stated in the constitution or bylaws,
see, e.g., EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AM., DEFINITION AND GUIDELINES FOR
DISCIPINE OF ORDAINED MINISTERS (1989); PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, CONSTITUTION OF
THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.): PART II, BOOK OF ORDER (1989), it may exist
through resolution, see, e.g., CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AM. RABBIS, RESOLUTION ON
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION (1976), or it may be implicitly understood.
Only the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox religions sacramentalize and formally require
the "course of discipline" involved with the privilege. Therefore, if a statute uses the term
or one of its variants, the scope of the privilege may be limited if a court construes the
term as a sacrament or formal mandate rather than as a church guideline or principle.
41. See Swenson, 237 N.W. at 589.
42. Id. at 590.

NOTE
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who bona fide seeks spiritual advice should be allowed it

freely.4
The Swenson case has been cited in related cases that extend the
privilege to clergy who are not specifically enjoined from disclosing

confidential communications by the stated canons or disciplines of their
church.'

State courts, however, have not uniformly followed the

reasoning of Swenson even when the particular statute being construed
may have allowed for such an interpretation.'

In Ball v. State,' the

Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that a Baptist clergyman was competent
to testify because the defendant's alleged confidential confession to him

did not fall under one of the tenets or disciplines of the clergyman's

church.47 Ball is distinguishable from Swenson, however, because the

minister in Ball told the court that he would not keep any admission of
criminal activity confidential, given that he did not believe such a
discipline was commanded by his church." The Indiana court did not
indicate whether its decision would have been different if the clergyman

had not been willing to testify.
A Kentucky case, Johnson v. Commonwealth,49 also demonstrates the
difficulty in determining when a privilege statute may apply. In a murder
prosecution, a Methodist pastor was called to testify as to his conversation
with the defendant in the county jail.'e On the pastor's claim of privilege,
the court ruled that the communications were not penitential in character

and that the pastor was not acting in the course of discipline prescribed by
43. Id. at 591.
44. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (citing
Swenson as support in construing the D.C. code to include a communication to a Lutheran
minister); Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Iowa) (citing Swenson in case
applying privilege to testimony of witnesses in course of annulment proceeding), appeal
dismissed, 323 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1963), on remand, 230 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1964),
aff'd, 340 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1965); see also TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 131
(stating that Swenson's definition of clergy includes spiritual representatives, as well as
others who are the source of spiritual discipline, advice, and remission of sins).
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1949). See infra notes
49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
46. 419 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. 1981).
47. See id. at 139. The defendant confessed to a clergyman that he had murdered
three people. The clergyman subsequently testified, freely telling the court that his church
did not mandate confession and confidentiality and that, even if it did, he would not follow
that mandate if it meant suppressing evidence of a crime. See id. at 13940.
48. See id. at 139-40.
49. 221 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1949).
50. See id. at 89.
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his church.5 1 The court reasoned that the defendant's statements to the
pastor were not in furtherance of some religious duty and that the pastor's
visits to the jail were entirely voluntary and unsolicited and, consequently,
not penitential in nature.52
In a recent case construing the privilege, the Utah district court held
that a communication that was nonconfessional in nature was privileged
because the defendant approached the clergyperson seeking religious
guidance and advice that was in the course of discipline of the defendant's
church.53 The court based its decision on its belief that the privilege
should "protect communications made (1) to. a clergyperson (2) in his or
her spiritual and professional capacity (3) with a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality..54
In response to questions raised by litigation or in the process of
constructing a statute, a majority of state legislatures have enacted statutes
that exclude the restraining words "course of discipline"55 or have
revised their statutes to include more than communications made in
furtherance of church discipline.' 6 These statutory provisions would
include information confidentially communicated to the pastor in her
professional role, regardless of the explicit requirements, or lack thereof,
of her denomination or religion.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 619 (D. Utah 1990). The case involved
an adopted daughter who sued her adoptive father for abusing her as a child. She requested
documents relating to the excommunication of her father from the Mormon Church, which
contained references to possible physical or sexual abuse. See id. at 611.
54. Id. at 616 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir.
1990)).
55. See supra note 40 for a definition of "course of discipline."
56. Consequently, the statutes are broad enough to cover more than confessions or
pure penitential communications. Nonetheless, the statutes of 19 states retain the
requirement that privileged communications be made in the course of discipline enjoined
by the church to which the clergyperson belongs. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 1030-34 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 9203 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2156 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp. 1991);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1987 & Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1983
& Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 1-12101 (1991).
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In addition to the issue of when a communication with a clergyperson
is protected, there is a question of definition: Who qualifies as clergy? The
statutes vary widely in their stated or implied scope. Some statutes seem
to limit "clergy" to Christian ministers or Jewish rabbis, with no

allowance for non-Christian, non-Jewish, or lay ministers who may
function in a similar capacity.' Other statutes are broader in definition
and employ phrases such as "other person or practitioner authorized to
perform similar functions""8 or "other similar functionary"" to

encompass the ever-increasing number of non-Christian, non-Jewish
religions that will confront American courts.'
What constitutes "communication" for purposes of the privilege was
considered in a 1974 South Dakota case, United States v. Boe."1 The case

involved a Lutheran minister, Paul Boe, who was cited for contempt by
the South Dakota district court when he refused to answer questions

concerning the occupation of Wounded Knee by a militant American

Indian protest group.62 Although the circuit court reversed Reverend

Boe's contempt citation on other grounds,' it is significant that Boe was
not asked to divulge the content of any conversations but rather to report

what he had observed at Wounded Knee.' Courts thus far have tended
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1991) (limiting the
privilege to "any Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith,
any priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or
Jewish minister by whatever name called"). See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the constitutional difficulties inherent in this statutory construction.
58. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991).
59. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1992); ME. R. EVID. 505; MISS. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985 & Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. R. EVID. 11-506 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.D. R. EVlD. 505; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West
1975 & Supp. 1991).
60. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
61. 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974). Since 1968, Boe had established ties with the
American Indian Movement, a militant protest organization. He was invited to the
"occupation" of Wounded Knee in the role of spiritual advisor. Boe made no claim to have
heard confessions at Wounded Knee and he did answer questions in the grand jury
proceeding that he believed would not betray confidences. However, he refused to identify
the people he saw at the "occupation," claiming that it would destroy his relationship with
them. See Dean M. Kelley, "Tell AW" or Go to Jail:ADilemma for the Clergy, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Jan. 30, 1974, at 96, 96.
62. See Boe, 491 F.2d at 971.
63. See id. The circuit court did not role on the merits but decided that Boe did not
have a meaningful opportunity to raise his defense in the lower court.
64. The court wanted to know who was there and who was carrying guns. See Kelley,
supra note 61, at 97.
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to interpret the privilege to cover written or oral communication but have
not been as willing to include simple observations. It could be argued,
however, that the observations of a person who is perceived to be
functioning in her professional capacity as clergy should be privileged
regardless of precedent, because it is increasingly accepted that human
beings communicate their thoughts and feelings in a variety of ways,
including speaking, writing, and acting.'
The state statutes vary widely concerning who may claim the
privilege. Traditionally, the privilege belonged to the communicant rather
than the clergyperson, in that the communicant could choose whether to
assert or to waive the privilege.' However, at least one state has
recognized that clergy have the right to assert the privilege even when the
communicant waives it.67 Other states grant the right of waiver only to
the clergy.68 And some states go so far as to prohibit either party from
waiving the privilege, thereby enacting the ultimate protection for
clergy.6
II.

CONTEMPORARY IMPEDIMENTS TO A BROAD PRIVILEGE

Given the historical and statutory background of the clergycommunicant privilege, several questions arise concerning its current
65. See Commonwealth v. Zezima, 310 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1974), in which the court
held that the privilege covered the showing of a gun during the course of otherwise
privileged communication, stating that "communication in § 20A [the privilege statute] is
not limited to conversation and includes other acts by which ideas may be transmitted from
one person to another." Id. at 592.
Including observations within privileged communications would not necessarily include
observations by clergy when they are not functioning or perceived as functioning in a
professional capacity.
66. See TIEMANN & BusH, supra note 9, at 150. See supra note 38 for a definiition
of "waiver."
67. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1992) (stating that a clergyperson has a
privilege to refuse to disclose a penintential communication).
68. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp.
1991). Granting waiver only to clergy implies that they will be more discerning than the
communicant about what should be privileged. However, it seems contrary to the policy
of encouraging free and full disclosure if the communicant has no say in the confidential
nature of the conversation.
69. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991). Because the
privilege is a mutual one, involving at least two parties, both parties should have some
control over the disclosure of otherwise confidential communications. Moreover, in spite
of a communicant's waiver, clergy may be concerned with keeping their own words
confidential, with their duty to maintain confidences, or with the protection of innocent
parties who may have been the subject of the communication.
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status and the contemporary impediments to an expansive interpretation.

These questions include: Is pastoral counseling ever secular and therefore
arguably outside the boundaries of the privilege? Do the statutes and
judicial decisions adequately define "clergy"? Should marriage counseling

be considered a confidential communication? Is the privilege justifiably
abrogated in cases of child abuse?

A. The Illusion of Secular Pastoral Counseling

All statutes appear to limit confidential communications to those
received by a clergyperson in her professional role.' But when does that
professional role begin and end? Given that none of the statutes demand

that the privileged communication be conveyed in the confessional, 7' it
follows that communication to a clergyperson that is intended to be

confidential should be kept confidential regardless of the time, place or

manner in which it is communicated. An underlying purpose of the

privilege is to encourage members of society to confess their wrongdoing
or seek counsel in order to be "healed."'

This purpose would be

undermined if the only communications protected were those technically
spiritual in nature or function.
Moreover, many denominations consider ordination to be an "all or
nothing" endeavor,' making it difficult to pinpoint when a clergyperson

is functioning in her professional capacity giving spiritual counsel and
when she is not. Arguably, counseling by a clergyperson is never secular

per se and should always be privileged.74 This assertion does not ignore
the reality that much of pastoral counseling is not traditional "spiritual

counseling."'

Nonetheless, counseling is never wholly secular because

70. See supra note 36 for specific statutory provisions.
71. Although some statutes may be read to cover only confessions, they do not limit
the place of those confessions to the confessional-that is, the specific place in the Catholic
Church where a penitent sits in a private cubicle with the priest in a nearby but separate
cubicle, so that the priest can hear the penitent but generally cannot see her. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (1987 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 9203 (1990). The traditional concept of the privilege as construed in this context, however,
was easier to define, interpret, and apply. Whatever was spoken in the confessional was
privileged; whatever was spoken outside the confessional was not.
72. Kelley, supra note 61, at 98. For more discussion of the policy and utility of
encouraging confession through the recognition of the privilege, see infra notes 206-14 and
accompanying text.
73. Most Christian religions ordain (or appoint) clergy for life and expect the
ordinand's life and work to reflect her calling at all times and in all places.
74. See IOPPOLO Er AL., supra note 37, at 158.
75. See CUNEBELL, supra note 4, at 103-393, for a discussion of the varieties of
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a pastor is always a pastor simply by virtue of who she is. A pastor's role
is not defined by what she says or where she says it. Given that
perception, the privilege cannot be simply defined by place but is more
clearly understood as person- and content-defined. Thus, whenever a
communicant consults a clergyperson, she may do so with the belief and
intent that what she says will not be divulged-without exception. Many
clergy and church members feel that this belief and intent must be honored
to ensure that trust and confidence in the church and the clergy will not
be lost.76
As the role of clergy in society continues to change, it seems
incumbent on courts and legislatures to consider these changes when
drafting and interpreting statutes.' Clergy in inner cities often walk the
streets in clerical garb, ready and willing to provide counsel at any
moment and at any place.' This practice should not be discouraged by
strict interpretations of spiritual or secular counseling or confessional
confidences. Clearly, persons in need of help will not be as willing to
confide in a clergyperson if they have to worry about being turned in.
Moreover, some clergy find that people are more comfortable and willing
to talk in their own environment than in a church office. 9 If a person
requests a home or workplace visit, a strict statutory interpretation of the
privilege would require that clergy preface their conversation with a
warning that it might not be considered confidential.' Such a warning
may be prudent, but it could ultimately prove counterproductive.
And what if a clergyperson in clerical garb enters a bar, a seemingly
unsacred place, fully intending to give counsel, lend support or listen?I
For several years in the Tacoma, Washington, area, clergy have been
doing just that in a program called "Operation Nightwatch."I Every
counseling that clergy are called upon to perform.
76. See Ponder, supra note 7, at 3.
77. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 192.
78. See infra note 82.
79. See CUNEBELL, supra note 4, at 190-94.
80. See Michael C. Smith, The Pastor on the Witness Stand: Toward a Religious
Privilege in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1, 2 (1984).
81. This question was asked in an editorial letter written by the Director of the Texas
Civil Liberties Union in response to an inquiry as to why the ACLU did not have a strong
and broad policy supporting protected communications between clergy and communicants.
See Cara LaMarche, But Who Is a Confessor?, DALLAS MORNING Nms, Oct. 16, 1985,
at 8.
82. "Operation Nightwatch" originated in St. Louis, Missouri, in the early 1970s. It
has now expanded throughout the country, placing clergy in the downtown areas of cities,
where they walk the streets or sit in bars, bus stations or restaurants seeking to help in
whatever way they can. Letter from the Rev. Dean C. Jones, Executive Director, Operation
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evening one of the clergy spends the night talking with people in bars or
"seedy" restaurants or on the street. Many of the patrons in the places the
clergy frequent know the clergy and know why they are there. This
"ministry of presence" is not evangelical, proselytory or directional in its
counseling focus. It is simply an attempt to meet people on their time and
in their place.
On a cold night in the fall of 1989, one of these pastors was out
roaming the bars and restaurants along a run-down Tacoma strip.' He
stopped in a tavern around 3:00 a.m. for a cup of coffee and sat down
next to a man with long dirty hair, dishevelled clothes, and several days
of beard on his face. The man saw the clerical collar and said he didn't
need any preaching. The pastor said he was just looking for coffee, not
somebody to preach to, but if the man wanted to talk, he would listen.
And so they talked. Actually, the man talked, and the pastor listened. An
hour later, they left together to get the man something to eat and a place
to stay. Earlier that evening, the man's belongings had been stolen from
a locker in the bus station, and all that was left in its place were two spent
bullets. "A warning," he told the pastor. He had been a drug runner for
one of Tacoma's major narcotics dealers and was now on the run himself
because he wanted out of the whole racket. But in his line of work you
didn't just quit your job.
There was no actual confession that night. There was no holy place
where the two men talked to give their conversation an aura of spirituality.
There was no absolution explicitly requested or offered. There were
simply two people-one who shared his life and his fears, one who
listened and gave counsel. And when asked if he would ever testify as to
the man's identity or the particulars of that conversation, the pastor
replied, "Never."
Similar communications between clergy and laity' occur all over this
country during any hour of any given day, whether in a Tacoma bar or on
a New York street. When people see the clerical collar or talk openly
because they know they are talking to a clergyperson, they believe and
intend that their words are between themselves, the clergyperson, and
God.' Given this perception, such confidence and trust should not
depend on where the communication took place or its seemingly secular
content-a distinction clearly not recognized by the communicant.
Nightwatch in Tacoma, Wash., to Lori L. Brooker, Author (Nov. 27, 1989) (on file with
the New York Law School Law Review).
83. The information in this and the following paragraph was obtained in an interview
with the Rev. Frank Brooker, Tacoma, Wash. pastor and "Nightwatch" participant, in
Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 11, 1989).
84. "Laity," in this context, includes all persons who are not clergy.
85. See Ponder, supra note 7, at 2.
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Yet, even if place restrictions were broadly interpreted, some statutes
would limit the privilege if the communicant sought counsel or guidance
rather than absolution or forgiveness.' The drafters of these statutes and
the courts that interpret them appear to be prisoners of traditions that
undermine the purpose of the privilege. Clergy are increasingly used as
counselors by people who do not trust or cannot afford more specialized
counselors. ' Moreover, even if a person could consult a psychiatrist,
therapist or social worker, she may choose to consult a clergyperson
because of the special commitment she brings to her profession."5 It
seems absurd to assert public policy justifications for encouraging the
clergy-communicant relationship' while undermining that relationship by
requiring express words of confession, forgiveness, and absolution in
order to claim the privilege.
The New York privilege statute avoids the potential for such a
restrictive interpretation by stating that disclosure of any confession or
confidence9 is not allowed, absent a communicant's waiver. Several
other states refer to "confidential communication" as privileged, leaving
out any express reference to "confession." 91 With this wording, courts
would still need to define "confidential communication," but such
communications would include more than confessions.
B. Defining Clergy in a Changing Society
The influx of immigrants into America in the twentieth century has
also brought different cultures, different belief systems, and different
religions.' The courts have yet to be confronted With non-Judeo86. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991)
(limiting the privilege to any "confession made to [a clergyperson] in his professional
character").
87. See CUNEBELL, supra note 4, at 70-71.
88. See id. at 46-49. Clinebell claims that people may choose to talk to a religious
or pastoral counselor based on the assumption that the counselor's guidance will be
informed by his or her faith.
89. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
90. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &R. 4505 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1991) ("[A] clergyman,
or other minister ... shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to
him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.").
91. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506
(1985 & Supp. 1991).
92. "Different religions" in this context includes all non-Judeo-Christian religions and
those religions and faith practices that have grown in numbers with the influx of, among
others, Asian, Hispanic, and East and West Indian immigrants, such as Buddhism,
Hinduism, Islam, and Pentecostalism.
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Christian religions or clergy in the context of the clergy-communicant
privilege. Indeed, courts have rarely been willing to define and decide
who are the clergy of a particular religion even within Judeo-Christian
parameters.' However, it seems plausible that courts will be confronted
with non-Judeo-Christian religions and clergy in the future, and when that
happens the inadequacy of the statutory definitions will be apparent. Given
the lack of legislative definition, the courts will have to decide whether the
privilege extends to Buddhism, Islam or any other of the many faiths
flourishing within America's shores. Moreover, in addition to determining
who functions as clergy in non-Western faiths, courts may be confronted
with the question of whether the privilege should extend beyond the
borders of the ordained, certified or functional clergy.
In both instances, the variations in the statutes provide more confusion
than clarity. The mainline Western denominations are often covered by
statutory terms such as priest, minister or rabbi.' Thus, if a person is
certified and ordained under those terms, it is generally clear that the
privilege applies. However, some statutes simply say "member of the
clergy,"' while others refer to "ministers of the gospel,"' thus limiting
the scope of the definition even moreY The better-drafted statute would
include all those who function as clergy or those perceived to do so by the
person seeking counsel." Such a definition would cover those who did
not fit the classic definition of clergy as long as they functioned, or were
perceived to function, in a similar capacity.
Although no court has decided a case precisely on the issue of who is
clergy,' several courts have confronted the issue of who should be
covered by the privilege even if they are not, and make no claim to be,
clergy. In In re Murtha,1' the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
the privilege did not extend to a nun, even though she had functioned as
93. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 114-21.
94. All of the statutes protect clergy within these classifications. See supra note 36 for
the specific statutory provisions.
95. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991).
96. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1991).
97. Limiting the privilege to "ministers of the gospel" arguably eliminates any clergy
or faiths that are not Christian, since the general connotation of "the gospel" is the history
and teachings of Jesus Christ and the Apostles. The "Gospels" are the first four books of
the New Testament-Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
98. See, e.g., OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) (defining
clergy as "a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner or other
similar functionary of a religious organization, or any individual reasonably believed to be
a clergyman by the person consulting him").
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. 279 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1971).
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a religious counselor."' The court reasoned that, regardless of the
content of the communication, a nun was not included within the New
Jersey statute because nuns do not perform the duties that are particular
to priests in the Catholic Church."°2 This reasoning may not hold up,
however, as the Catholic Church expands the role of nuns and lay
Catholics to compensate for a shortage of priests."es If the Catholic
Church authorizes the laity or sisterhood to preside over the sacrament of
communion, it seems plausible that Catholic parishioners would also
perceive them as worthy of presiding over other sacraments-including,
perhaps, penance-or of giving counsel.
In some Protestant denominations laypersons have long had significant
responsibilities under the doctrines of their church." 4 Courts have
generally been reluctant to scrutinize a church's doctrines or organization
beyond ascertaining whether the denomination recognized the laity as
functioning in the manner of clergy."e For example, one court held that
the ruling elders"°6 of an Iowa Presbyterian church fell under the
privilege because they were functioning in the religious capacity that their
denomination ascribed to them." However, this decision focused
entirely on the polity of the Presbyterian Church, which appeared to
include elders under the statutory definition of "ministers of the
gospel.""3° Thus, its reasoning may not be helpful in cases in which the
role of lay workers is not explicitly defined in church documents.
Some statutes may be interpreted to encompass communications
overheard or found by a church worker. In those instances, the privilege
will cover otherwise confidential information that was compromised when
it was heard or seen by a church secretary or other layperson who was
intentionally or unintentionally present or had access to the
101. Sister Murtha had functioned as a spiritual advisor to the defendant for several
years. Nonetheless, she was forced to disclose the content of a conversation she had with
the defendant on the night the defendant was supposed to have committed a murder. Id.
at 890, 892.
102. See id. at 892.
103. See IOPPOLO ET AL., supra note 37, at 11-12.
104. See, for example, the applicable provisions of the constitutions of the
Presbyterian and Evangelical Lutheran churches delineating the service of deacons, elders,
and associates in ministry, EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AM., supra note 40,
passim; PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, supra note 40, G-6.0100, G-6.0300, G-6.0400.
105. See TOPPOLO ET AL., supra note 37, at 161-62.
106. "Elders" are the governing officers of a church, who often have pastoral or
teaching functions.
107. See Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917).
108. Id. at 292-93.

1991]

N07E

communication." ° Mississippi's statute has a section that explicitly
covers this situation,' but Mississippi is not the norm. In considering
privileges generally, courts usually hold that a third person is not covered
by the privilege and may be compelled to testify, even if she was not
supposed to be a party to the communication."'
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
privilege exists even in the presence of third parties if their presence is
"essential to and in furtherance of the communication." 1 2 The
counseling session at issue involved four people who allegedly participated
in or were aware of an arson attack on a black family in their
neighborhood. The pastor moved to quash the subpoena compelling him
to testify."' Even though the case was remanded, the court clearly
believed that the privilege should not be lost simply because of the
presence of a third party if that party was there legitimately. This ruling,
however, would not cover communications to which a third party was an
unintentional listener or participant.
It seems irrational to argue, by analogy to the other privileges,""
that a third person destroys the confidential nature of an intended
privileged communication simply by being in the next office or by
eavesdropping.' 15 Given that one of the stated policies underlying the
privilege is to encourage confessional or therapeutic communications to
clergy,' intentional or unintentional overhearing should not change that
communication or relationship in any way from that intended by the
clergyperson or the communicant. The privilege stands for little if such
behavior by a third party can destroy it." 7
109. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1985 & Supp. 1991), HAW. R. EVID.

506(2).
110. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1991). The applicable provision reads:
"A clergyman's secretary, stenographer or clerk shall not be examined without the consent
of the clergyman concerning any fact, the knowledge of which was acquired in such
capacity." Id.
111. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 144-45.
112. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990). The court
vacated the district court order and remanded for further proceedings, however, because
the record was insufficient to establish whether the people present at a counseling session
should be considered third parties as the court had defined them. See id.
113. Id. at 376.
114. See supra note 8 for a listing of the other privileges.
115. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 145.
116. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
117. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 144-45. Although a discussion of the
destruction of the attorney-client privilege by a third party is beyond the scope of this note,
similar arguments could be raised in that context-that is, communications intended to be
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It may also become increasingly difficult to narrow the scope of the
privilege by adhering to a traditional concept of clergy and their
professional functions. As stated previously, the Catholic Church has
responded to its clergy shortage in America by assigning some of the
traditional priestly functions to laypersons or nuns.11 ' Other churches
and synagogues may be staffed by part-time clergy or worker-priests, thus
blurring the identity of the professional clergyperson.119 Many statutes
include Christian Science practitioners among those covered by the
privilege," z but those practitioners often have other employment. Should
such employment negate their function as practitioners? Are children
covered if they are functioning as missionaries or revivalists, as is the case
in some Southern fundamentalist religions? Can the self-ordained claim the
privilege? Would a Buddhist monk or an Islamic mullah fall within the
privilege? And if not, do significant constitutional questions arise?
Although such difficulties will inevitably confront the courts, there is
little case law to guide them. Many statutes state or imply a JudeoChristian bias."' Georgia's statute allows the privilege for "any
Christian or Jewish minister."" 2 In addition to the constitutional
difficulties discussed below, it is difficult to articulate sound policy
reasons for excluding religions and clergy that are not traditional in the
United States. Society benefits equally when a person seeks the aid,
comfort, and counsel of an Islamic mullah or a Catholic priest. " It will
be incumbent on a court confronting this issue to examine the statutory
language and either to interpret it as broadly as possible to include such
communications in furtherance of public policy or to declare the statute
unconstitutional as violative of the constitutional premise that mandates the
free exercise of all religions and precludes the establishment, or special
treatment, of only some religions." u
Arguably, there is one clear area in which a claimed church body or
clergyperson should not be recognized, and that is when it is established
for the purpose of avoiding taxes. Case law indicates that courts will not
confidential between a client and her attorney should at least presumptively remain so in
spite of a third party's actions.
118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
119. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 122.
120. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 1641-101 (Michie 1987), ARK. R. EVID. 505;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.505 (1991).
121. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (establishing
the privilege for clergypersons and priests who belong to a church).
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Michie 1981 & Supp. 1991).
123. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 121.
124. See infra notes 165-213 and accompanying text.
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give credence to a religious organization or leader if there is no evidence
of a religious function other than drawing benefits from the Internal
Revenue Service." s Although it is unfortunate that self-denominated
clergy or church bodies attempt to circumvent the tax or legal system by
seeking religious exemptions or privileges, the testimonial privilege need
not be limited as a consequence. Any statute could easily be interpreted
to exclude all churches or clergy that could not withstand the test of the
Internal Revenue Service."
As the United States grows and is enriched by its pluralism, courts
and legislatures must respond accordingly when confronted with claims of
privilege by religious persons or organizations that do not easily come
within the statutory definitions. Of course, the courts may continue to
avoid the issue whenever possible, out of reluctance to confront the
privilege at all. Nonetheless, legislatures should act either to broaden the
statutory language or to ensure inclusion under the existing statutes of
virtually all clergy, or their functional equivalent, of legitimate religious
bodies. Such action could serve as a strong and decisive guide for the
judiciary.
C. Marriage Counseling
Marriage counseling is one of the clergy's most important counseling
responsibilities."n Statistics show that fifty-seven percent of the people
who come to clergy for help and guidance are there because of marriage
or family difficulties."n At least forty-five percent come for marriage
counseling alone."n Since effective counseling of such couples
necessarily includes a meeting of both partners with the clergyperson,1 "
the question inevitably arises whether the privilege will cover such a
meeting when the applicable statute or case law rejects the privilege in
situations where third parties are present." 1 Moreover, the content of
125. See, e.g., United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
defendant's conversations with a minister of a "tax-protest" church concerning defendant's
effort to evade tax payments were not entitled to the protection of the clergy-communicant
privilege).
126. The IRS generally looks to the purpose and function of the so-called religious
body, making its determination by scrutinizing worship practices, doctrine, policy, and
ecclesiastical systems. See United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1100 (7th Cir. 1981).
127. See CuNEBEIL, supra note 4, at 243.
128. Id. at 243 & n.3, 244.
129. Id. at 243 n.3, 244.
130. See id. at 270-71.
131. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 191.
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the sessions may not be covered if the statute excludes nonconfessional,
or nonspiritual, guidance.132
In Simrin v. Simrin," a California district court held that the
statutory privilege did not cover communications made to a rabbi acting
as a marriage counselor. Although the court expressed frustration with this
aspect of its decision, it nonetheless felt constrained by the statutor'
language. 1" The court stated that, without the statutory restrictions,
public policy would have directed a different outcome, for marriages are
to be preserved, and counseling with a clergyperson was a good and
important step for troubled couples to take in moving toward such
preservation. 1" Nonetheless, the rabbi was compelled to testify.
A New York Supreme Court reached a different result in Kruglikov
v. Kruglikov. 37 In Kruglikov, a couple consulted a rabbi hoping to find
some way to stay together. During the subsequent divorce proceeding, the
rabbi refused to testify, claiming that the communications were
confidential."' The court agreed, even though the couple was not part
of the rabbi's congregation, holding that "[i]t cannot be supposed that
either husband or wife, or both, would have been willing to disclose their
marital problems to the rabbi if they thought that what they said would
ever be divulged, even in a judicial proceeding."139 Although the
language of the New York statute was virtually identical to that of the
statute construed in Simrin, the New York court looked to the "spirit of
the statute""4 rather than the literal language.
Simrin and Kruglikov are good indicators of the variation and division
in the courts on this issue.141 Some legislatures have enacted statutes that
explicitly cover the privilege in marriage counseling, ostensibly in an
132. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
133. 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
134. See id. at 378-79.
135. In 1966, the California statute limiting the privilege to confessions was expanded
in scope. See CAL EVID. CODE § 1032 (West 1992). The expanded statute would likely
have dictated a different outcome in Simrin, especially given the court's reluctance to
decide as it did.
136. See Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
137. 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961), appeal dismissed, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (App.
Div. 1962).
138. See id. at 846.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 847. The result in Kruglikov is not surprising, given the commitment of the
New York courts to a "'broad and liberal construction'" of the privilege. Id. (quoting
People v. Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d 559, 562 (N.Y. 1955)).
141. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 124.
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attempt to avoid such judicial confusion.14 In 1975, Delaware became
the first state to enact such a statute,1 " and other states have since
followed suit.'"
From a policy perspective, it makes little sense to cover pastoral
counseling in some forms but to exclude marital counseling. 145 In a
country that places such a high premium on the stability of marriage and
family life, guidance and counsel in times of marital and family conflict
should be encouraged. The chilling effect that will inevitably ensue any
time a couple or family believes that their "dirty laundry" may be aired
the very structure that marital counseling seeks to
in public 1undermines
4
maintain.

Moreover, given the high divorce rate in the United States,

actions intended to turn that rate around147 by avoiding unpleasant and
destructive litigation should not be discouraged.
The legislators of the many states that do not explicitly protect marital
communications should recognize statutorily what the church, the clergy,
and troubled couples have known for years. To protect the marriage and
to encourage stability and reconciliation, it must be clear to all concerned
that any communication intended to be confidential will remain so despite
the nonconfessional character of the communications or the presence of a
third party.
D. Child Abuse Overrides: Overzealous Legislation?
In arguing for a broad interpretation of the clergy-communicant
privilege, the most difficult application to justify is in cases of child abuse.
The statistics on child abuse are staggering, whether they are limited to
reported cases or include estimates."' Some states couple privilege
statutes granting an expansive privilege to clergy in all other respects with
142. See id. at 125.
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4316 (1975) (specifying that clergypersons shall
not be examined on communications made in connection with efforts to reconcile estranged
spouses), repealed by DEL R. EVID. 505 (1981).
144. See, e.g., AlA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1990) (covering "conversations with persons
seeking ...advice in connection with marital problems").
145. See Sandra M. Little, Counsel by Clergy: Is it Privileged?, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 24,
25 (1987).
146. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 191.
147. See Little, supra note 145, at 25.
148. See William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse:
A Statutory and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 4 (1987).
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statutes mandating reporting of child abuse to override the privilege and
compel testimony.'49
This conflict between the privilege and the state's attempt to prevent
child abuse has led to the imposition of sanctions on clergy who invoked
the privilege in this context. In a highly publicized 1984 case in
Florida," 5 the Reverend John Mellish was cited for contempt of court
for refusing to testify that a parishioner had confessed to abusing his sixyear-old daughter."' Although Mellish served only twenty-four hours
of a sixty-day sentence, the case stimulated numerous amicus briefs from
church bodies and much media attention,"' not only because of the
difficulty of the issue, but also for the particular facts of the case.
Ironically, Mellish was cited for refusing to answer questions after he had
succeeded in convincing the alleged abuser to turn himself in." Thus,
for his attempt to protect society, and specifically his parishioner's
daughter, Mellish was jailed. In an interview after his incarceration,
Mellish maintained the legitimacy of his actions: "I would never divulge
the confidence that was shared with me. [However,] I would do
everything that was in my power to be able to prevent it in whatever
[other] means that I could.""
Florida is not the only state that responded to the increased incidence
of child abuse by abrogating virtually every privilege in such cases except
the one between attorney and client.' Most people want child abusers
to be punished or, at the very least, stopped. However, the statutory
abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege that has occurred in the
past decade may not be the best way to achieve that goal."1 One
concern is that such an abrogation ultimately undermines one of the most
important justifications for the existence of the privilege, which is to
encourage people to confess their wrongdoing and to change their
149. See id. at 6.
150. The court record of the Mellish case is found primarily in transcripts of two
hearings held in State v. Sands, No. 84-9516 CF (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County
sentencing Feb. 25, 1985), on Aug. 31, and Sept. 4, 1984. The order dismissing the
Mellish case is found in Mellish v. State, No. 84-1930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Aug. 30,
1985).
151. See Record at 2, Sands, No. 84-9516 CF (Aug. 31, 1984).
152. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Sacred Confession (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 29,
1985) [hereinafter 60 Minutes] (transcript on file with the New York Law School Law
R evew).
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id.
155. See Cole, supra note 148, at 6 n.37.
156. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 177-78.
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ways.157 The principle that confessions to clergy of criminal activity may

go undisclosed has been accepted by both courts and legislatures.

This

principle is weakened by abrogating the privilege for an isolated, though

horrible, crime.
In Mullen v. United States,'

the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit refused to separate child abuse from other crimes and
upheld the privilege even though the case involved a mother who chainedup her children when she left the home." Although Mullen was a
federal decision, and thus is not binding on the states, it indicates that

abrogation of the privilege in child abuse cases is not the only law of the
land. Several states explicitly except the privilege from requirements of
child abuse reporting."' Interestingly, Florida has repealed the statute
that was in effect during the Mellish case and now upholds the privilege
in instances of child abuse." 6
In spite of society's interest in getting all possible evidence against

child abusers, the abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege is too
high a price to pay. A chilling effect on religious confession and guidance
seems inevitable. " Moreover, if this crime is sufficient to compel
otherwise privileged testimony, other crimes may someday be deemed
157. Interview with the Rev. Oliver Thomas, Legal Counsel for the American Baptist
Churches, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 1989).
158. See Cole, supra note 148, at 40.
159. 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This case was decided on the basis of federal
common law when no statutory privilege was available in this jurisdiction.
160. See id. at 280.
161. See APiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620G (1991); FIA. STAT. .ANN. ch. 415.512
(1986 & Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Michil/Bobbs-Merrill 1990);
MD. PAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-705 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (1991);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.255 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1991); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6381 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503 (1989 & Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-210
(1986 & Supp. 1991). In addition, some states exempt the clergy from the requirement to
report child abuse cases by implication. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (1990); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.74 (1986 & Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4015 (West
1992); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1046 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A551 (1989 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1991); S.D.
CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-15 (1984 & Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1411
(1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.11 (Michie 1991).
Washington's Supreme Court recently held that ordained clergy do not have to report
child-abuse cases if they learned about the situation in the course of their official duties.
See Washington v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990).
162. See FLA. STAT. ch. 415.512 (1991).
163. See Cole, supra note 148, at 39.
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sufficiently heinous also, and may potentially erode the privilege into
virtual meaninglessness. 16'
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRIVILEGE

A. Is There a ConstitutionalJustification?
Although scholars and judges have referred to the constitutional
implications of the privilege, no case has turned on the issue of
constitutionality.'" The privilege has always been more directly
supported or disputed on evidentiary and public policy grounds." As
a consequence of the statutory recognition of the privilege, rather than
recognition of the privilege at common law, courts can more easily
dispose of cases by simply deciding whether the communication falls
within the parameters of the particular statute. 167
Despite the lack of constitutional litigation, arguably the religion
clauses of the First Amendmentla are applicable, and they indeed have
been used to bolster defense arguments. In United States v. Boe,"r
Reverend Boe raised a defense based on South Dakota's statutory privilege
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."7 Although the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed his contempt
conviction," it did so on grounds unrelated to the Free Exercise
Clause." Nonetheless, the briefs filed for Boe argued that religious
organizations should be free to establish their practices and beliefs as they
164. See TIEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 178; see also Cole, supra note 148, at
40. Cole writes: "Ifgovernment can force a clergy member to violate sincere religious
beliefs whenever he or she even suspects that a child's physical or emotional well-being is
at risk, then certainly it can do the same when the clergy member has even the slightest
information about virtually any other crime." Id. (footnote omitted). But cf. EVANGEUCAL
LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AM., supra note 40, at 4 (1989) ("Ordained ministers must respect
privileged and confidential communication and may not disclose such communication,
except ...if the person is perceived to intend great harm to self or others.").
165. See loPPoLo ET AL., supra note 37, at 160.
166. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
167. See Ponder, supra note 7, at 3.
168. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or the free
exercise thereof.. . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
169. 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974).
170. See Ponder, supra note 7, at 3; see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
171. See Boe, 491 F.2d at 971.
172. Id. (holding that Boe was denied due process requirements of notice and a
meaningful opportunity to present his defense).
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choose.' 3 More specifically, if a religious body determines that
confidentiality is a responsibility of the clergy, then the clergyperson's
refusal to disclose information is ultimately a free exercise of her
religion.174 The implication of the briefs, and of the argument generally,

is that those religious disciplines that clearly define and mandate
confidential communication between clergy and communicants

can

legitimately argue that the right to the free exercise of religion guarantees
their right to silence.

In analyzing the privilege within the context of the Free Exercise
Clause, it is necessary to state the standard that the Supreme Court has
developed to protect the free exercise mandate. A tripartite test must be

applied: (1) The court must first determine if the statute at issue places a
burden on free exercise, (2) if so, that burden must withstand strict
scrutiny by outweighing the religious interest, and (3) the state must

employ the least restrictive means to satisfy its compelling interest. 75 If
the argument is accepted that clergy or communicants who refuse to

disclose confidences do so out of commitment to their religious beliefs,

then this test would be applied any time the privilege was denied.' 76
One of the clear burdens imposed by denying the privilege is the
chilling effect on confidential communications. As has been asserted
repeatedly in this note, people often approach clergy fully expecting and
intending that any confidential or confessional information will never be

disclosed." 7 If that information is disclosed, either inadvertently or
through compelled testimony, it is likely that further communication will

be inhibited. 178 It is conceivable that not only would a communicant's
religious beliefs be burdened, but also that such disclosure would destroy

173. For a discussion of the Boe briefs, see Ponder, supra note 7, at 3.
174. Id.
175. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (mandating strict scrutiny analysis
in free exercise cases); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (relaxing
the standard by providing that if the state's restriction is neutral and the impact on religion
is merely incidental, then the Free Exercise Clause is not violated).
176. See Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege
Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 412 (1987), in which the
author argues that religious confidentiality statutes ultimately violate the Establishment
Clause, even though they are necessary to ensure that the free exercise rights of clergy or
communicants are not infringed. That author concludes, contrary to the conclusion of this
note, that the courts, not the legislatures, should decide the issue through case-by-case
inquiry. See id. at 423.
177. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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her trust and confidence in the church and ultimately inhibit any desire to
seek spiritual aid or counsel."
The clergy's free exercise rights may also be violated if clergypersons
are forced to choose between the law of their faith and the law of the
state. This dilemma is especially acute for Catholic clergy, because canon
law mandates the secrecy of the confessional and punishes violation of that
law by excommunication." ° In In re Keenan v. Gigante,151 a Catholic
priest made this First Amendment claim, refusing to testify on the ground
that his faith and vows ultimately gave him no choice. Gigante spent ten
days in jail for contempt of court and yet, in a later interview, he
reiterated his commitment to the privilege of the confessional: "[By
testifying] to the authorities ... I could destroy an entire institution that

is sacred.""s
Although the Catholic Church has an express doctrine of the seal of
the confessional, many other faiths assume and expect that their clergy
will keep confessions, if not all other confidential communications,
inviolate." In In re Swenson,' the court itself extended the privilege
to the Lutheran minister involved. All clergy could theoretically be placed
in the position of Father Gigante and forced to choose between their
beliefs and jail. Such a choice is a clear burden on a clergyperson's free
exercise rights, with a concomitant burden on the rights of the
communicant.
In applying strict scrutiny1" to the burdens imposed by denying the
privilege, it is not self-evident that the state's interest substantially
outweighs those burdens. In all instances when a clergyperson is receiving
information from a communicant who has committed a crime,ls 6 the
state is imposing an affirmative duty on the clergyperson. 1 Generally,
179. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
180. Telephone Interview with Father Mareni, Representative of the Archdiocese of
New York, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 6, 1989). See supra note 21 for a discussion of
applicable canon law.
181. 390 N.E.2d 1151 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
182. 60 Minutes, supra note 152, at 14.
183. See loPpoLo Er AL., supra note 37, at 154-55.
184. 237 N.W. 589 (Minn. 1931).
185. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (requiring strict scrutiny analysis
when a state's objective raises an impediment to an exempted religious group's free
exercise of religion); see also supra note 177 and accompanying text.
186. No other situations compel disclosure to the extent that criminal activity does.
For example, in marriage counseling, the social benefit is heavily weighted to the side of
confidentiality because there is little threat to society.
187. See IoPPoLo Fr AL, supra note 37, at 33-34.
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there is no duty to turn in another person or to report or stop a crime.5 5
This general rule should not be abrogated for clergy, especially because
there are valid justifications for doing everything possible to foster the
relationship between the clergyperson and the communicant.1"
Granted, legislatures have asserted that there is a duty to warn of or
to report instances of child abuse." Yet, even if a duty to abused
children on the part of clergy can be justified, does it necessarily follow
that such a duty is best fulfilled by disclosure? 9 ' One writer claims that
there is no statistical evidence that clergy reporting is any more effective
than continued counsel of the child abuser.' 92 Moreover, as was true in
the case of Reverend Mellish," the abuser may be far more willing to
change her ways and cooperate with the authorities precisely because she
trusts her pastor enough to confide in her and accept her guidance." '
As for the last prong of the free exercise standard, which requires the
state to employ the least restrictive means of achieving its goal, there are
arguably always less restrictive means in this context than compelling
disclosure. The state will rarely be confronted with a situation in which
the clergyperson's testimony is the only evidence attainable. And it seems
questionable to deny the privilege simply because a state claims that a
confession to a clergyperson is the best evidence it can garner. Moreover,
the inconsistency and ambiguity of statutory protection leave open the
possibility that a court will arbitrarily impose sanctions that would be
unnecessay
if statutory definitions were clearer or if the privilege was
absolute. 1y
The difficulty in using the Free Exercise Clause to justify the privilege
is that, because the state could always attempt to prove a compelling
interest, the privilege could never be absolute. " Moreover, even if the
Free Exercise Clause is interpreted to mandate the privilege, the
Establishment Clause could then be raised as a countervailing argument.
A further question would arise: Are communications to clergy protected
more than communications to nonreligious counselors are protected?" 9
188. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
(stating a general rule that a person has no duty to control the conduct of another or to
warn others endangered by such conduct).
189. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
191. See Cole, supra note 148, at 40.
192. Seeid. at44.
193. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
194. See Cole, supra note 148, at 45.
195. See id. at 51.
196. See Mayes, Note, supra note 176, at 417.
197. But cf Washington v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990) (discussing why

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 36

In confronting this issue, a court would apply the Establishment
Clause test formulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 198
This three-prong test considers the secular purpose of the statute, whether
its primary effect advances or inhibits religion, and the potential for
excessive entanglement of the state and religion.199
When considering the secular purpose of the privilege, it is
fundamental to look not only to the practices of the church bodies, but
also to the interest that a state may be advancing by providing for the
privilege. Thus, if the state or the churches believe that the privilege will
further religion, the privilege may violate the Establishment Clause. But
if there is a stated and legitimate secular purpose, such as maintaining a
person's mental health or right to privacy, the privilege is less
problematic. Moreover, there is little justification in claiming that the
privilege involves governmental coercion, because the government does
not order anyone to engage in a religious relationship.
If the primary effect of a privilege statute is ultimately to endorse
religion, then arguably the second prong of the test is violated. However,
no statute explicitly limits the privilege to religious communicants. Thus,
the potential benefit to any particular religious body is mitigated by a
concurrent benefit to society, because anyone may approach a
clergyperson for absolution or counsel. 201
Finally, in inquiring into the potential for excessive entanglement
between government and religion, it is not clear that the privilege
interferes with religion or the government in any definitive way. It could
be argued that, by absolving clergy from testifying, the state is furthering
communications with clergy. However, this enabling is not necessarily a
per se violation of the Establishment Clause.' On the contrary,
compelling clergy to testify could well be classified as a highly excessive
and intrusive entanglement of government and religion.
Arguably, the most difficult potential conflict with the Establishment
Clause would arise if a court construed a privilege statute so narrowly as
to favor one religion over another. For example, if the court held that a
communications to nonclergy counselors are not protected by the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause).
198. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
199. Id. at 612-13.
200. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1991). The Preamble to this statute
states: "Whereas, the emotional, mental and spiritual health of many of our citizens
depends upon the free and confidential access to their clergymen or spiritual advisors." Id.
201. See sdpra notes 72, 77-80 and accompanying text.
202. But see Mayes, Note, supra note 176, at 408 (arguing that privilege statutes per
so violate the Establishment Clause because the state will interfere with and inquire into the
practices of particular denominations).
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confession to a Catholic priest was privileged but excluded a similar
situation within another religion, the claim of unconstitutionality might be
raised.' 3 However, in Sherbert v. Verner' the Supreme Court held
that different treatment of religions is not a per se violation of the
Establishment Clause.
B. The Public Policy Mandate
The clergy-communicant privilege has traditionally been asserted on
public policy grounds. Although society has a fundamental interest in
obtaining the best evidence possible for use at trial, it also has a
competing interest in protecting relationships whose furtherance may
ultimately be of greater benefit. The original public policy concern
asserted in defense of the privilege was that people would not confess their
wrongdoing and, thus, after death would go to hell.' While this
rationale would probably not hold up in modem American courts, the
secular aspect implicit in the reasoning has been maintained. Society
arguably benefits if people who are troubled or guilty of wrongdoing seek
counsel, guidance or forgiveness.'
In this way, the relationship
between clergy and communicant is similar to that of husband and wife,
attorney and client, or doctor and patient. That is, the assumption of
confidentiality encourages people to enter into relationships that are often
described as "socially desirable."'
There is a countervailing concern,
whenever the privilege is claimed, that helpful or necessary evidence will
be suppressed. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, even the greatest
opponents of the testimonial privileges have recognized the legitimacy and
social necessity of the clergy-communicant privilege. 8
The judiciary is also in a difficult position if it compels a clergyperson
to testify. Most people, regardless of their religious beliefs, would be
uncomfortable with forcing a clergyperson to violate what she believes to
be a sacred confession or confidence.' Judges are probably no
different.21 Many clergy would likely choose to go to jail rather than
203. See TEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 146.
204. 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
205. See Kelley, supra note 61, at 98.

206. See TiEMANN & BUSH, supra note 9, at 23.
207. Ponder, supra note 7, at 2, 3.

208. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
209. See Yellin, supra note 24, at 110.
210. See IoPPOLO Er AL., supra note 37, at 154 ("[P]olicy judgment might make it
imprudent to call clergy unwilling to testify about matters received in confidence, and
judges might still be loathe to compel testimony from priests and other clergy determined
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be a party to the possible destruction of the communicant's trust and faith
in the church."' Thus, the judiciary would be taking a "bad situation
and making it worse." 2 In the words of Justice Holmes: "We have to
choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals
1 3 should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."
V.

CONCLUSION

This note has attempted to illustrate some of the inadequacies and
potential pitfalls of the current status of the clergy-communicant privilege.
Although the privilege is generally recognized, it is not uniformly or
consistently defined or applied. With the ever-expanding role of the clergy
in our society, it is probable that these inconsistencies and inadequacies
will increasingly confront the courts, unless courts continue to avoid the
issue out of respect for, or fear of confronting, religion.
It is unfortunate that the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, is
often reluctant to hear a case that turns on the issue of the clergycommunicant privilege. The Supreme Court could provide clear guidance
for the states and for the lower courts as to the rationale and the outer
limits of the privilege.
With or without such a ruling, this writer believes that the best clergycommunicant privilege is an absolute one. As a protection of an
individual's privacy and religious liberty and, most importantly, as a
recognition that, for our society, there may be some relationships that are
more important than the furtherance of the adversarial system, the
privilege encourages and enables consciences to be unburdened and fears
to be assuaged. The chilling effect on a communicant's willingness to
confide created by compelling clergy testimony is ultimately a far greater
burden to society than the loss of one witness. We as a society can ill
afford to shake the very foundation of many of our citizens' lives. It is
incumbent on the legislatures and the courts to seriously reconsider the
potential effects of their statutory construction and analysis in the areas
discussed. If they do so, there may lie in the future an affirmation of a
broad and expansive privilege that will further the growth and stability of
this fundamental relationship rather than its erosion and possible
destruction.
Loi Lee Brocker
to remain silent.").
211. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
212. Ari L. Goldman, Cases in Three States Challenge Privacy of Talks with Clergy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1985, at A19.
213. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

